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Abstract
This paper investigates the use of theories of mechanics (classi-
cal and quantum) to provide answers to questions in the metaphysics
of spatial location and persistence. Investigating spatial location, I
find that in classical physics bodies pertend the region of space at
which they are exactly located, while a quantum system spans a re-
gion at which it is exactly located. Following this analysis, I present a
‘no-go’ result which shows that quantum mechanics (conventionally
interpreted) restricts the available options for locational persistence
theories in an interesting way: it demonstrates that the spatiotempo-
ral path of a persisting thing is discrete (or discontinuous) in time.
This leads to unpalatable consequences for both perdurantists and
endurantists. In particular, I argue that Butterfield’s ‘anti-pointilliste’
perdurantism is ruled out, and show that endurantists relying on im-
manent causation run into trouble. I conclude by suggesting the re-
vival of Whitehead’s alternative mode of persistence called ‘reitera-
tion.’
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In the introduction to her monograph How Things Persist, Hawley (2004)
writes that: “Metaphysical reflection can help us discover what kinds of
empirical facts are relevant to questions about persistence and identity,
what kind of facts should be the focus of our investigation” (2). Recent
metaphysical reflections about persistence have suggested that the kind of
facts that are relevant to these questions have to do with location. That is,
facts about how things are spatiotemporally located determine how those
things persist.1 I will call this the locational approach to persistence. Al-
though some controversies remain, there appears to be a general agree-
ment that the classic conflicting accounts of persistence—endurance and
perdurance—can be precisely characterized in locational terms without prej-
udicing the outcome of the debate. To choose between theories of persis-
tence on the locational approach requires, therefore, input from elsewhere.
The consideration of persistence in the context of relativistic spacetime
has provided a major motivation for the development of locational accounts
of persistence. Roughly, the idea is that a persisting object (like a table,
banana, etc.) occupies its worldtube (a region of spacetime) and differ-
ent theories of persistence correspond to different ways that the object can
be said to be located at that four-dimensional region. Since endurance re-
quires persisting objects to be three-dimensional (i.e., spatial), the failure of
∗I would like to thank Gordon Belot, John Earman and John Norton for useful comments
on an early draft of this paper. Comments and suggestions by several anonymous reviewers
also proved helpful. Revisions to the paper were made with the assistance of a Provost’s
Postdoc in the Humanities from the University of Southern California.
1Relevant authors include Balashov (2000, 2002, 2010), Donnelly (2011), Gibson and Poo-
ley (2006), Gilmore (2006, 2008, 2013), Hudson (2005) and Parsons (2007, 2008).
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relativistic spacetimes to provide a unique foliation into spacelike hyper-
planes of simultaneity has been thought to provide an argument in favor
of perdurance, according to which persisting objects are four-dimensional
(Balashov 2000). Replying to such arguments on behalf of the endurantist
has provided one impetus for the sophistication of locational accounts of
persistence (Gibson and Pooley 2006; Gilmore 2006).
This paper is concerned with the import of physics for the locational ap-
proach, but not with relativistic spacetime. Instead, I investigate the meta-
physics of location (and thereby persistence) by examining the location re-
lations of theories of mechanics, both classical and quantum. The guiding
idea is that to reach a verdict on how physical objects persist in actuality we
should pay close attention to how the location relations invoked by meta-
physicians compare with their cousins in physics, at least where spatial
location is concerned. Both classical and quantum mechanics supply loca-
tion relations that are well-suited to play this role. By examining the way
that these location relations set up a map between physical objects (point
particles, extended bodies, quantum systems) and their locations (spatial
regions) at a time, I argue that classical bodies pertend the regions at which
they are exactly located (Hudson 2005), whereas a quantum system spans a
region at which it is exactly located (McDaniel 2007; Simons 2004).
By extending this account of location to spacetime (and so persistence)
one might hope to supply necessary and sufficient conditions for a physical
object to exactly occupy a spatiotemporal region, and so answer Gilmore’s
(2006) ‘Location Question.’ Since different theories of persistence require
incompatible answers to this question, with a satisfying answer from physics
in hand one could decide which of the rival theories of persistence holds in
the actual world. Unfortunately, though, in considering classical mechan-
ics I find myself in agreement with the verdict of Butterfield (2005) that
both endurance and perdurance are equally well-supported. However, I
demonstrate that quantum mechanics places a severe restriction on the sort
of spatiotemporal regions at which a system can be located. This restriction
serves at least to narrow down the available metaphysical options, if not in
quite the way that Gilmore may have hoped.
The potential relevance of quantum theory for the persistence debate
has been often acknowledged but seldom heeded. For example, in con-
cluding an account of relativistic persistence, Gilmore (2008) wrote:
[This] paper has had nothing to say about the impact of extant
quantum theories themselves on issues about the metaphysics
of persistence. For all I have said here, e.g., quantum field the-
3
ory in its current form may decisively settle these issues in favor
of one of the views already on the table or, alternatively, it may
show that the current range of options is incomplete or some-
how ill-formulated. (1247)
While in the introduction of his recent book on the locational approach to
persistence, Balashov (2010) wrote:
It is not immediately clear how to extrapolate the notions cen-
tral to the debate about persistence to general relativistic space-
time [. . . ] More importantly, it is even less clear how to think
about persistence in the context of (non-relativistic) quantum
mechanics. [. . . ] This is not to suggest that questions of this sort
should not be raised. (9)
In the following, I show that there is a clear way to think about persis-
tence in (non-relativistic) quantum mechanics by adapting definitions from
the metaphysics of location to the standard way of describing the location
of a quantum system in terms of a localization scheme.2 Following this path, I
am led to conclude that the second alternative considered by Gilmore turns
out to be the case: considerations from quantum theory suggest that the set
of options considered thus far by the locational approach to persistence is
ill-formulated or incomplete.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 I show how both clas-
sical and quantum mechanics supply location relations suitable to play the
role of exact location, as considered by Gilmore (2013); Parsons (2007). I
then give precise characterizations of two opposing metaphysical views of
spatial location: pertension and spanning. Considering classical and quan-
tum mechanics in turn, I show how the location relation of classical me-
chanics satisfies the definition of pertension, whereas a quantum system
must span a region at which it is exactly located, thus confirming the sus-
picions of Simons (2004).
Section 2 begins with a brief account of Gilmore’s (2008) use of ex-
act occupation to classify locational theories of persistence. I then show
how both the endurantist and perdurantist can use the location relation of
classical mechanics to define satisfactory accounts of persistence in those
terms. I also suggest a precise characterization of Butterfield’s (2006c) ‘anti-
pointilliste’ perdurantism (which I dub B-perdurance) that allows only non-
instantaneous, temporally extended temporal parts. This leads me to intro-
2This contrasts with an earlier approach to quantum theory where location relations
were not taken into account (Pashby 2013).
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duce two ways for a persisting object to have temporal extension: (i) having
temporal extent (by existing at two or more instants), and (ii) being tempo-
rally extended (by, e.g., existing over a entire temporal interval).
With this distinction in hand, I demonstrate in Section 3 that the dy-
namical law of quantum mechanics (the Schro¨dinger equation) limits the
spatiotemporal regions that a physically reasonable system can exactly oc-
cupy to be those with (at most) mere temporal extent. More generally, this
limitation on the sort of regions at which a quantum system can be said
to exactly occupy serves to rule out the possibility that such a system can
be located at a continuous spatiotemporal path, which has been a common
(although often implicit) assumption of the locational approach to persis-
tence.
In Section 4 I draw out the implications of this result for the locational
approach to persistence. While it seems that the perdurantist, who main-
tains that persisting things are four-dimensional and persist by having tem-
poral parts, should be particularly inconvenienced by my result, defini-
tions of endurance and perdurance have been largely insensitive to the
distinction between temporal extension and extent. Not so Butterfield’s
B-perdurantist, however, who definitely runs into trouble here. I also con-
tend that an endurantist who relies on a relation of immanent causation to
secure the identity through time of persisting things in terms of their state
at the regions they occupy faces an uncomfortable dilemma. This section
concludes with some remarks on the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Faced with the difficulties of existing accounts of persistence to accom-
modate the discontinuous spatiotemporal path of a quantum system, Sec-
tion 5 briefly outlines an alternative account of persistence not currently
under active consideration by metaphysicians. That is, if we are to account
for the persistence of things that follow a discontinuous spatiotemporal
path, I suggest that we should expand our options to include a distinctive
mode of persistence which Whitehead (1925) called reiteration.
1 Location and Physics
Let us begin with the classical mechanics of point particles (or point masses),
the persistence of which is analyzed at length by Butterfield (2005). If a
particle pi follows a path determined by the equations of motion then in
general its path is (the image of) a continuous curve through spacetime.
Such a curve can be thought of as a (partial) function fi : R → M from
a domain of times to spacetime. Let’s assume that M is non-relativistic
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so that there is a privileged way of dividing up the set of all point-events
e ∈ M into disjoint simultaneity slices.3 Let’s also assume that time is com-
posed of instants, in which case an instant of time, It, is a three-dimensional
(i.e., spatial) hyperplane that includes all and only the point-events in some
simultaneity slice.
In that case, the spatiotemporal path of a point particle assigns to each
time t that the particle exists a (spatial) point fi(t) ∈ It.4 It seems fair to
say that the particle is located at each of these points, and also that it is
located at their union: its (spatio-temporal) path. The persistence debate
enters as follows. Endurantists will want to say that the very same object is
located at each spatial point in this path. Perdurantists, on the other hand,
maintain that an object persists by having distinct temporal parts located at
different times; for them, the points fi(t) are the locations of distinct objects
(albeit objects mereologically related as parts to a whole).
There is much more to say about the expression of theories of persis-
tence in locational terms. Before doing so, however, I would like to draw
attention to the distinctive ways that spatial location is treated in classical
and quantum mechanics. Now, considering only point particle mechanics
on the classical side, there is not much to say: at a time, a particle is lo-
cated at a point. Nonetheless, there is also continuum mechanics, which
describes the behavior of extended classical bodies, and quantum mechan-
ics. In this section, I will argue that the metaphysicians’ distinction between
two ways for objects to be spatially located—pertension and spanning—
corresponds precisely to the way that matter is described as being located
in space by classical mechanics on one hand, and quantum mechanics on
the other.
1.1 Metaphysics of Spatial Location
Confining our attention to a single instant of time, It, we can divide up
our simultaneity slice into spatial regions in various ways. These regions
will give the possible locations of a physical object. Since not every phys-
ical theory will agree about the kinds of regions at which an object can
be located, we require a general notion of a collection of regions that will
apply in every case. A suitable notion is provided by a Boolean algebra of
3Simultaneity is an equivalence relation on point-events; a simultaneity slice is an equiv-
alence class of point-events under the relation of simultaneity.
4There is a further complication introduced if our spacetime respects Galilean relativity
(i.e., treats all inertial frames as equivalent), in which case these paths must be given relative
to an inertial frame. This will not be particularly relevant to our concerns here.
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regions, S = 〈S,∨,∧,¬〉, where S is a collection of subsets of It, and ‘∨’, ‘∧’
and ‘¬’ are, respectively, operations of disjunction, conjunction and nega-
tion. A Boolean algebra supplies a (minimal) notion of parthood since it
comes equipped with an associated partial order ‘≤’ where r ≤ s just in
case r = r ∧ s. Thus 〈S,≤〉 is a partially ordered set (or poset). When one
region is part of another, r ≤ s, we will say that r is a subregion of s; a
subregion r ≤ s is proper, r < s, if r ∧ s 6= s.
As an example of a Boolean algebra, consider the Borel sets of the real
line. To form the Borel sets of R, we can begin with the collection of all
open intervals (a, b) ⊆ R and close this collection under complementa-
tion, countable union and countable intersection. Taking this as our set of
subsets S, with disjunction, conjunction and negation given by set-theoretic
union, intersection and complementation (respectively), we obtain a Boolean
algebra (more specifically, the Borel σ-algebra of R). Repeating this proce-
dure but beginning with open ‘cubes’ (a, b)× (c, d)× (e, f ) ⊆ R3 leads us
to a Boolean algebra of regions of space (viz., the Borel σ-algebra of R3).
Unless otherwise stated, this will serve as our algebra S .
One reason to use the Borel sets as spatial regions is that they each
have a well-defined volume, i.e., they are (Lebesgue) measurable sets. This
would not be the case if we were to take the power set ofR3 as our Boolean
algebra, for example. However, there are more measurable sets than there
are Borel sets and so we may choose instead to use the (Lebesgue) mea-
surable sets to define a Boolean algebra of regions, in the much same way.
As we will see, in quantum mechanics the set of viable spatial regions is
obtained by first identifying measurable sets that differ only by a set of
measure zero,5 which means that null sets (e.g., countable sets of points)
are identified with the empty set. In continuum mechanics, the spatial re-
gions are given in topological terms as regular open sets which also ex-
cludes (countable collections of) points from being viable regions. In both
cases the underlying space is assumed to be a point-set and it is only the re-
gions that ignore point-based distinctions; space itself is not thereby forced
to be ‘gunky’.6
5For example, the closed interval [a, b] has measure |b − a|, and so too does the open
interval (a, b) since it differs from [a, b] by a set of measure zero, {a, b}. Considered with
respect to Lebesgue measure on R, a set of reals has measure zero iff it can be entirely
covered by a countable set of open intervals (ai, bi) ⊂ R of arbitrarily small length, |ci −
di| < ε for any ε > 0.
6Arntzenius and Hawthorne (2005, 446) regard this as an unstable position since they
distinguish between the set of ‘gunky’ regions at which an object can be located and the
‘genuine’ regions of space, given presumably by the power set of R3. However, they pro-
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Having arrived at a suitably general definition for the spatial regions,
S , we now require a precise notion of what it is for an object to be located
at a region. Consider again a classical point particle pi located at the spa-
tial point fi(t) ∈ It (at time t). Although at each time this point particle is
located at a single point, it also passes through any spatial region that inter-
sects the point fi(t) non-emptily. The former notion is called exact location;
the latter is weak location. Parsons (2007) contends that either can be taken
as fundamental.
Following Parsons (2007), and taking exact location as primitive, an ob-
ject x is weakly located at region r ∈ S just in case x is exactly located at a
region s ∈ S that has a subregion q ≤ s such that q ≤ r, i.e., when s and r
overlap. Parsons further analyzes exact location by saying that an object x
is exactly located at a region r iff x is entirely located at r and x is pervasively
located at r. Essentially, Parsons says that an object x is entirely located at
a region r when it is weakly located at r and x is not weakly located at the
spatial complement ¬r, while an object x is pervasively located at (or per-
vades) a region r if x is weakly located at every subregion of r. Given our
algebra of regions S , and taking exact location as primitive, I adapt these
definitions as follows:
Exact Location. If an object x is exactly located at region r ∈ S then:
• x is weakly located at every subregion q ≤ r and at every region
s ∈ S such that q ≤ s for some q ≤ r
• x is not weakly located at any region q ≤ ¬r.
Thus if an object x is exactly located at r then it is entirely located at r and
pervades r. In order to match the other direction of Parsons’ biconditional
I further maintain:
Entire Location. If an object x is entirely located at a bounded region7 r
then there exists some subregion q ≤ r at which x is exactly located.
Pervasion. If an object x pervades r then there exists no proper subregion
q < r at which x is exactly located.
vide no reason to introduce an additional algebra of spatial regions beyond the algebra of
regions at which material objects can be located. For a detailed discussion of the virtues of
an approach that takes space to be a point-set but regards regions as the bearers of proper-
ties, see Butterfield (2006a).
7I have restricted the definition to bounded regions alone since I want to avoid the pos-
sibility that an object could be exactly located at an unbounded region merely as a result of
being entirely located there. For our purposes, a region is bounded iff it has finite Lebesgue
measure.
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Therefore, if an object is entirely located at a bounded region r that it per-
vades then it is exactly located at r.
We are now in a position to consider the ways that an object can be
said to occupy a spatial region, which involves parthood relations for both
objects and regions. For this purpose, let us define a partial order ‘’ on
the domain of objects such that when two objects x, y stand in the relation
of parthood, x  y, we will say that x is a part of y. This is a minimal notion
of mereology, but it will suffice for now.
When it comes to the metaphysics of occupation there are essentially
two options: either an object x occupies a spatial region r at which it is
exactly located by having additional parts w  x exactly located at every
subregion q ≤ r, or it does not.8 If not, then an object x can occupy a region
r in virtue of being exactly located at r without having any parts exactly
located at the (proper) subregions of r. Such objects are called spanners by
Hudson (2005, 101), in that here x spans the spatial region r by pervading
each subregion without having any proper parts (exactly) located at those
subregions.9
The first option, however, corresponds to a mode of occupation that has
become known as pertension.10 Inspired by Parsons, Hudson (2005) says
that an object x pertends a region r if it has a part w  x (exactly) located at
each subregion q ≤ r. In order to understand this relationship better, it will
be useful to consider the relation of exact location as a set-theoretic map
from a domain of material objects O to a codomain of spatial regions S .
In particular, if x ∈ O is exactly located at r then the extension of the
binary relation of exact location includes the ordered pair 〈x, r〉 ∈ O × S .11
If every object x ∈ O is exactly located at (at most) a single region then this
relation defines a (partial) function f : O → S . Therefore, when an object
x ∈ O pertends a region r ∈ S the relation of exact location defines an
surjective function from a domain of parts of x to a codomain of subregions
of r.12 (That is to say, every subregion r ≤ s has some part w  x mapped
to it by exact location.)
However, since O and S are posets, partially ordered by ‘’ and ‘≤’
8The first case is called the Geometric Correspondence Principle by Simons (2004); the
second is his Extended Simples Principle.
9This terminology is due to McDaniel (2007). Spanners are called ‘extended simples’ by
Simons (2004).
10As the name suggests, this is intended to be the spatial analogue of perdurance.
11I will continue to use S rather than the set S, an abuse of notation for which I apologise.
12Here I adopt standard set-theoretic language, according to which a function is surjective
(or onto) when every element of the codomain is mapped to by an element of the domain.
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(respectively), there is a further condition that we should impose: that the
parthood relations of objects mirror the parthood relations of the regions at
which they are exactly located.13 In particular, we will maintain that:
Pertension An object x pertends a region r if exact location defines a func-
tion f : O → S from the parts of x to the subregions of r that is (i)
surjective, and (ii) order-preserving, i.e., if x  y then f (x) ≤ f (y).
Just in case such a map exists, we will say that x pertends r. If x is exactly
located at r without the existence of such a map then we will say that x
spans r. I will now argue that the bodies of continuum mechanics pertend
the regions at which they are exactly located, whereas quantum systems
merely span the regions at which they are exactly located.
1.2 Location in Continuum Mechanics
In continuum mechanics, matter is described not as a collection of point
masses but as a continuum of extended massive bodies located at overlap-
ping three-dimensional spatial regions.14 On the side of matter, a contin-
uum body is described as a collection of massive bodies, partially ordered
by parthood. On the side of space, we have a collection of regions of three-
dimensional Euclidean space. Essentially, a continuum body occupies a
region of space by virtue of a mapping between a collection of parts and
a collection of spatial regions, called a placement. If we take the placement
to give the extension of the exact location relation, then this fits very well
with our definition of pertension.
In Truesdell’s (1991) classic exposition, the collection of bodies form a
Boolean algebra known as a universe of bodies, ΩM, so (as explained above)
a body can be considered as a poset ordered by parthood, i.e., as our do-
main of objects O. A prototypical example of a universe of bodies is given
by the σ-algebra of regular open sets of a topological space T = (X, τ),
where M ∈ τ is regular if M is equal to the interior of its closure (Truesdell
1991, 15–18).15 A body, B, is a regular open set of T and the parts of the
body are the regular open sets of T that are subsets of B. These sets also
form a Boolean algebra comprising B and its parts, which we can take to
13This idea is called mereological harmony by Uzquiano (2011).
14For recent commendable attempts to introduce into contemporary metaphysics some
considerations from continuum mechanics, see Smith (2007) and Wilson (2008).
15This definition ensures that points are not parts of bodies. For more on the relationship
of topology, spatial regions and Boolean algebras see Aiello et al. (2007).
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correspond to our collection of objects O.16
The instantaneous location of a continuum body is given by a placement,
χ(·, t). At a time t, the placement χ(B, t) maps the points of B ∈ τ to points
of three-dimensional Euclidean space, E (which comes equipped with the
usual topology). The range of this mapping (a set of spatial points) is called
the shape, St, of B. The placement at a time can also be considered as the
restriction of a homeomorphism from T onto E , in which case it maps reg-
ular open sets of T to regular open sets of E . Thus each part of B (itself a
regular open subset of B) is mapped to a regular open subset of St (its shape
at time t). The Boolean algebra of subregions of St is called the universe of
shapes, ΩS, which corresponds to (a subalgebra of) our algebra of regions
S .17
To see that this amounts to an order-preserving surjection from the parts
of B to the subregions of St, note that χ(B, t) defines a Boolean homomor-
phism between ΩM and ΩS, which preserves Boolean operations and is
thus order-preserving. Moreover, since the placement χ(·, t) has an inverse
homeomorphism (defined similarly), a body cannot be located at a shape St
without the existence of a complete collection of parts located at the subre-
gions of St (Truesdell 1991, 87). Restricting the domain of χ(B, t) to just the
parts of B a placement thus defines an order-preserving surjective function
between the universe of bodies and the universe of shapes.
In that case, so long as we take this mapping to correspond to the exten-
sion of the two-place relation ‘exact location,’ we have satisfied the defini-
tion of pertension given above. Furthermore, a collection of point particles
trivially satisfies the definition of pertension18 and so it seems that classi-
cal mechanics returns the definitive verdict that matter pertends the spatial
regions at which it is exactly located.19
16In addition, we have a mass function that assigns to each body (or part) a non-negative
mass. This function defines a measure over we integrate in order to find the total mass
that lies within some spatial region at which the body is (weakly) located. Because only
regions with nonzero volume have nonzero mass, there are no massive points in continuum
mechanics. See (Truesdell 1991, 92).
17For technical reasons, Truesdell further restricts the subregions to the Boolean algebra
of ‘fit’ regular open subsets of St Truesdell (1991, 87–91). For our purposes this distinction
is unimportant, but see Smith (2007, §4) for a discussion of these reasons.
18The placement here (at a time) is a function from the set of particles to the set of their
point-locations. It is obviously surjective, and the partial order (given by set-theoretic in-
clusion in each case) will be preserved.
19Unfortunately we cannot claim full generality since classical field theories are excluded
from this analysis. Since field theories do not lend themselves to the definition of location
relations in the sense discussed here it seems likely that a new approach would be needed.
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1.3 Location in Quantum Mechanics
In a certain sense, the location relation of quantum mechanics resembles
that which we found in continuum mechanics: each quantum system comes
equipped with a localization scheme that associates regions of space with
states of the system. However, quantum mechanics is at heart a probabilis-
tic theory and so it will require some work to provide a suitable definition
of exact location. I will argue that for any possible location of the system
there is a condition on the state of the system given in terms of the lo-
calization scheme such that, when satisfied, the system can be said to be
located (or localized) within that region.20 This condition is given through
the association of projection operators with regions of space defined by the
localization scheme, ∆ 7→ Pˆ∆, which associates to a region of space ∆ ∈ S a
projection operator Pˆ∆.21
As von Neumann originally demonstrated, any observable of the sys-
tem corresponding to a self-adjoint operator (like position, Qˆ) defines a
family of associated projection operators (through its spectral measure).22
In the standard von Neumann–Mackey interpretation, these projection op-
erators are thought of as representing propositions about the system that
may be true or false (or neither). Mathematically, to each such projection
operator there corresponds a subspace of H, the Hilbert space of the sys-
tem; operationally, for each projection there is an experimental question
that can (by performing an appropriate measurement) be ‘asked of’ the
system to find out whether or not the proposition is true. The probability
of finding on measurement of Pˆ∆ that the corresponding proposition is true
is given by the Born Rule.23
Each projection operator Pˆ∆ corresponds to the experimental question:
Is the system (now) located within region ∆? On this interpretation, if
this experimental question receives an affirmative answer then the propo-
sition that the system is located within ∆ is true (at the time the question
was asked). Unfortunately, this interpretative posit is controversial since
it seems to require the ‘collapse of the wavefunction’ on measurement of
Pˆ∆. However, it is widely accepted that if the probability of finding an af-
20Wightman (1962) demonstrates in general terms that a unique localization scheme can
be found for both relativistic and non-relativistic quantum systems.
21More generally, this is a Projection-Valued Measure (PVM) which maps an element ∆ of
the σ-algebra of Borel sets ofR to the projection operator Pˆ∆. See Teschl (2009) for technical
details.
22Again, see Teschl (2009) for details.
23For more details see Mackey (1963); Von Neumann (1955). For a philosophically ori-
ented introduction to this formalism see Hughes (1989).
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firmative answer to the question before measurement of Pˆ∆ is unity then
the corresponding proposition is true, and no measurement is required to
confirm this.24
This idea suggests a relatively uncontroversial condition for a quantum
system to be located at a given spatial region. For a quantum system with
(pure) state ψ ∈ H, the probability of finding the system to be located in a
region ∆ is given by the Born Rule:
Pr(∆) = 〈ψ|Pˆ∆ψ〉, (1)
where 〈·|·〉 is the inner product for H, and ψ ∈ H is a unit vector. If this
probability is one, Pr(∆) = 1, then the proposition ‘the system is located
within ∆’ is true. The antecedent holds just in case Pˆ∆ψ = ψ, which is to
say: a system in state ψ is located at ∆ when ψ is an eigenstate of Pˆ∆ (with
eigenvalue 1). As I now explain, this condition also ensures that the system
is (weakly) located nowhere else and thus serves as a suitable definition of
entire location for a quantum system.
Recall that, as I defined it, if an object is entirely located at a region
r then it is not weakly located at any disjoint region q ≤ ¬r. Now, if a
quantum system is located at region ∆with probability zero then it is surely
not (weakly) located there. And if a system is not (weakly) located in the
complement of ∆ (that is, the region ¬∆), then it is not (weakly) located in
any region disjoint from ∆. Therefore, so long as the condition Pˆ∆ψ = ψ
suffices to ensure that Pr(¬∆) = 0 then it provides a suitable notion of
entire location. It is easily seen that this is the case.
In quantum mechanics, if we are concerned just with questions about
location at a time (and not with incompatible questions about momentum,
say) then the probabilities for location in disjoint regions simply add:
Pr(∆ or Σ) = 〈ψ|Pˆ∆ψ〉+ 〈ψ|PˆΣψ〉 = 〈ψ|Pˆ∆∨Σψ〉. (2)
Furthermore, since ψ is a unit vector the probability of finding the system
somewhere in space is always one,
Pr(S) = 〈ψ|PˆSψ〉 = 〈ψ|ψ〉 = 1, (3)
24Here I mean to endorse the forward implication of the eigenstate-eigenvalue link, a bi-
conditional which says that a system is in a eigenstate of a self-adjoint operator (such as a
projection) iff it is found to have the corresponding (eigen)value upon measurement. The
forward implication follows simply from the Born Rule. The reverse implication requires
taking a stand on the notorious measurement problem, which I hope to avoid.
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which is to say that the projection operator associated with all of space is
the identity, PˆS = I. Therefore, if Pˆ∆ψ = ψ then the probability of being
located at a region disjoint from ∆ is zero:
Pr(S) = 1 = 〈ψ|Pˆ¬∆ψ〉+ 〈ψ|Pˆ∆ψ〉
1 = 〈ψ|Pˆ¬∆ψ〉+ 1
=⇒ Pr(¬∆) = 〈ψ|Pˆ¬∆ψ〉 = 0.
Thus Pˆ∆ψ = ψ provides a sufficient condition for a system in state ψ to be
entirely located in region ∆.
Unfortunately, though, essentially the same argument shows that the
condition Pˆ∆ψ = ψ can hold without the system pervading the region ∆,
so that Pˆ∆ψ = ψ is necessary but not sufficient for exact location at ∆.25 To
reach a sufficient condition, we need to specify explicitly that the system is
both entirely and pervasively located at the region in question. We can do
this by ensuring that a system is exactly located at a region only if it is not
entirely located at any proper subregion, as follows:
Quantum Location. For a quantum system O in state ψ and any bounded26
spatial region ∆ assigned projection Pˆ∆ by the localization scheme of
the system, O is exactly located at ∆ iff (i) Pˆ∆ψ = ψ; (ii) there is no
proper subregion Σ < ∆ such that PˆΣψ = ψ.
When both conditions hold we have 0 < 〈ψ|PˆΣψ〉 < 1 for all Σ < ∆ and so
∆ is the minimal region at which the system is entirely located. If we accept
that a quantum system is weakly located at Σ when 0 < Pr(Σ) < 1 then it
therefore pervades ∆.
Since this definition of quantum location makes no reference to parts of
quantum systems, I claim that quantum systems are spanners. That is, a
25To see that Pˆ∆ψ = ψ is not sufficient, consider a proper subregion region Σ < ∆ at
which we assume the system is entirely located, PˆΣψ = ψ. In that case, the system is still
entirely located at ∆ since Pˆ∆ PˆΣψ = Pˆ∆ψ = ψ. However, there exists a subregion of ∆,
namely ∆ \ Σ (the complement of Σ in ∆), at which the system is not (weakly) located since
Pr(∆) = 1 = 〈ψ|PˆΣψ〉+ 〈ψ|Pˆ∆\Σψ〉
1 = 1+ 〈ψ|Pˆ∆\Σψ〉
=⇒ Pr(∆ \ Σ) = 〈ψ|Pˆ∆\Σψ〉 = 0.
26Again, I restrict the definition of exact location to bounded regions since I want to avoid
allowing that a system could be exactly located an unbounded spatial region simply as a
result of being entirely located there.
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quantum system can be exactly located at a region ∆ without having any
(proper) parts exactly located at subregions of ∆. This deserves further
comment. I have previously suggested that the localization scheme pro-
vides a way to assign a ‘spatial part’ ψ∆ to a region ∆ for a system in state
ψ by operating on the state with the corresponding projection operator, i.e.,
ψ∆ = Pˆ∆ψ (Pashby 2013). This defines a quantum state ψ∆ that, were it
the entire quantum state of the system, would be entirely located at ∆. Fur-
thermore, the projection operators Pˆ∆ inherit a (minimal) parthood relation
from the subspaces ofH to which they are associated that mirrors the mere-
ological relations of the regions.
Therefore, a quantum system could pertend a region ∆ by having a com-
plete collection of spatial parts ψΣ exactly located at the proper subregions
Σ < ∆. However, unlike the placement of classical mechanics, the location
relation of quantum mechanics makes no reference to any such parts, and
a quantum system exactly located at ∆ is (by definition) not exactly located
at any proper subregion Σ < ∆. Furthermore, compound systems in quan-
tum mechanics are formed by taking the direct product of their associated
Hilbert spaces. As a result, Caulton (2015) goes so far as to argue that the
axioms of mereology fail for quantum systems of electrons. While Bigaj
(2016) replies that spatial properties can be used to individuate quantum
particles, saving mereology for collections of electrons (but not their parts),
on neither account could quantum systems be said to pertend their exact
locations.
This, then, confirms Simons’ suspicion that quantum mechanics pro-
vides motivation for taking spanners (his ‘extended simples’) seriously:
We have to think of P’s occupation of R [a region that it spans]
as a holistic fact: all of P occupies all of R, and that’s all there is
to it. This does not rule out variations in what we might call the
intensity of P’s occupation. Some parts of R might be more in-
tensely occupied by than others. This would accord quite well,
for example, with the idea that [. . . ] a fundamental [i.e., quan-
tum] particle’s relationship to its voluminous locus is not uni-
form, in that there is a probability density defined over the vol-
ume, the probability being that of the particle’s being located at
a position upon collapse. The probability density, which is de-
rived from the wave equation for the particle [i.e. its quantum
state ψ], need not be uniform over the locus, but its integral over
the whole locus is equal to one. (Simons 2004, 377)
This idea is broadly right: when a quantum system is exactly located at a
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region ∆ it need not have a uniform probability density across the region.






This expresses Pˆ∆ in terms of the so-called improper position eigenstates,
|q〉, associated with spatial points q ∈ R3.27 The probability of a system in
state ψ being entirely located at a region ∆ is then given as an integral over
a (properly normalized) probability density f (q):







Evidently this integral may be equal to one without f (q) (the ‘intensity
of occupation’) being uniform over ∆, and in general it will not be uni-
form. Note, however, that f (q) is a probability density, and as such does
not give the probability for being located at a point q. To turn a probability
density into a probability requires integration, but the probability of being
located at a point given by this integral is always zero since a point has
zero volume. Thus Simons’ idea that a probability density somehow gives
the probability for a quantum particle’s “being located at a position upon
collapse” is misleading unless position is taken to mean region.
At a first pass, the sort of regions at which a quantum system can be
located are those in the domain of the localization scheme, ∆ 7→ Pˆ∆. Let’s
take these regions to be the Borel sets of R3 (discussed above) which form
a Boolean algebra S . However, some Borel sets have (Lebesgue) measure
zero, in which case the probability of a quantum system being located at
such a region is zero and thus a quantum system could never be (entirely)
located there. Reflecting this fact, such sets are mapped by the localization
scheme to the null projection (whose range is the null vector). Therefore, a
quantum system cannot be entirely located at a point, nor a line (nor any
m-dimensional subspace of R3, where m < 3). Furthermore, since prob-
abilities are formed by integration, there can be no observable difference
between predictions concerning two spatial subsets differing by (at most)
a set of measure zero. This justifies the contention that the more appropri-
ate Boolean algebra of regions for quantum mechanics, SQ, is to be formed
by first identifying such regions. In that case, it can be shown that entire
27It is important to note that, as |q〉 is improper, |q〉 /∈ H and so the state of the system
cannot be |q〉, which is another way to say that a quantum system cannot be located at a
spatial point. See below for further details.
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location at a bounded region ∆ implies exact location at some subregion
Σ ≤ ∆.
Quantum Entire Location. If a quantum system O is entirely located at a
bounded region ∆ ∈ SQ then there exists some subregion Σ ≤ ∆ at
which O is exactly located.
Proof. Assume for reductio that there is no subregion Σ ≤ ∆ at which the
system is exactly located. By assumption, the system is entirely located at
∆. But it is not exactly located at ∆, in which case there exists some proper
subregion Σ < ∆ such that PˆΣψ = ψ. However, since the system is not ex-
actly located at Σ either, there must exist a proper subregion of Σ at which
the system is entirely located. Evidently this process can be continued in-
definitely, each time removing a region of finite measure from considera-
tion. Therefore, in the limit we reach a region of Lebesgue measure zero at
which the system is entirely located. But the probability of being found at
any such region is zero. Contradiction.
Given the interest of metaphysicians of persistence in relativity the-
ory, it is worth commenting here on results concerning relativistic localiza-
tion. First note that, restricting one’s attention to a particular inertial frame,
Wightman (1962) shows that a relativistic quantum system does have a lo-
calization scheme of exactly the type discussed here, and so everything I
have said about quantum location so far carries over unchanged. How-
ever, a relativistic localization scheme displays an alarming dependence on
the choice of inertial frame. In particular, a state ψ∆ that is exactly located
at region ∆ according to the localization scheme of some inertial frame will
not be exactly located at any spatial region according to the localization
scheme of a distinct inertial frame.
Intuitively, the reason for this is not hard to discern: a three-dimensional
region ∆ of a relativistic spacetime that is spatial according to inertial frame
A will be spatiotemporal according to inertial frame B (related by a Lorentz
boost). Therefore, a region ∆ ∈ SA at which a system is located according
to the localization scheme A is not a spatial region at all according to local-
ization scheme B, i.e., ∆ /∈ SB. Still, one might expect that every nonempty
intersection of that region ∆ with some region that is spatial according to
the inertial frame B would be a region at which the system can be located.
But here we encounter a problem of dimensionality: the intersection of two
three-dimensional spatiotemporal regions is two-dimensional. A spatial re-
gion, yes, but not the sort of region at which a system can be located—the
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probability of being located at a region of zero volume is always zero.28
Some have taken results along these lines to suggest that any relativis-
tic quantum theory must be a field theory, not a particle theory (Halvorson
and Clifton 2002; Malament 1995). My inclination is to suppose that the
answer to these worries about relativistic localization is to define a Lorentz
invariant notion of localization at a four-dimensional spatiotemporal re-
gion. However, there are severe difficulties that arise when attempting to
define a notion of localization within a region that is extended in time as
well as space. In Section 3.2, I present a result which can be interpreted
as ruling out this possibility. Since this result also has implications for the
locational approach to the metaphysics of persistence, I turn to this topic
first.
2 Location and Persistence
The basic question at the heart of the debate over persistence is this: how
can the self-same thing be said to persist through time while its properties
change?29 The debate has often been framed as a dispute between the en-
durantist, who believes that properties predicated of a persisting object at
different times are possessed by the same three-dimensional thing, and the
perdurantist, who believes that these properties belong to distinct temporal
parts of a four-dimensional thing. In recent years, motivated by attempts to
frame the positions in relativistic terms,30 or perhaps seeking ways to avoid
complaints that these two views amount to essentially the same thing,31
many participants have sought to couch the debate in terms of location in
spacetime.
In the above discussion of the metaphysics of spatial location we con-
sidered the sort of location relation that might hold between an physical
28The discussion here is somewhat superficial: it is not just that the region ∆ fails to
be a spatial volume but also that the probability density fA(q, t) associated with a given
spatiotemporal point by localization scheme A will not be equal to the probability den-
sity fB(q, t) assigned by localization scheme B. This is because the improper eigenstate |q〉
of the Heisenberg picture (Newton-Wigner) position operator of a given inertial frame is
not an improper eigenstate of the position operator for another inertial frame. For further
discussion, see Butterfield and Fleming (1999); Debs and Redhead (2003).
29This is sometimes called ‘The Problem of Change.’ A major desideratum for a theory
of persistence is that it should make sense of the claim that a persisting object changes its
properties over time without logical inconsistency.
30See (e.g.) Balashov (2000, 2010), Gibson and Pooley (2006), Gilmore (2006, 2008).
31For such complaints see (e.g.) McCall and Lowe (2003), Miller (2005), Hirsch (2005,
2009).
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object (as described by physics) and a spatial region. However, physical
theories do more than specify location at a time: in the classical mechanics
of point particles, for example, a solution of the equations of motion for the
system is a spatiotemporal curve which describes the location of the sys-
tem at all times. In the metaphysics literature, (the image of) this curve is
known as its spatiotemporal path. Locational theories of persistence specify
what it is for a material object to endure, perdure, etc. in terms of the way
that a persisting object is located at its path.
So let us begin with the idea that any material object O has a spatiotem-
poral path P.32 Informally, the spatiotemporal path of an object O includes
all the spatiotemporal regions at which O can be found, and there is no re-
gion included in P at which O can’t be found. Gilmore presents this idea as
follows:
a region R is an object’s path (my term) just in case R has a
subregion in common with all and only those regions at which
the object is weakly located. This captures the thought that a
thing’s path is the region that exactly corresponds to the thing’s
complete history or career. (Gilmore 2008, 1228)
Note that this definition is satisfied if one simply forms the union of all the
(time-indexed) regions at which an object is exactly located. In that case, it
seems tempting to say that a persisting object is exactly located at its four-
dimensional path. Endurantists, however, will want to resist this idea since
they maintain that an enduring object can only be exactly located at a three-
dimensional region.33 But what should the endurantist say instead? This is
a controversial matter.
In discussing spatial location I made use of Parsons’ (2007) relation of
exact location, which holds between an object and a region only when ev-
ery other region is completely free of that object. Since an object can be
exactly located at (at most) one spatial region at a time, this seems to make
multiple location impossible. We saw this in the way that the relation of
exact location defines a map between objects and spatial regions that is a
(partial) function: every object is mapped to (at most) one region. In con-
trast, an object multiply-located at two distinct regions would be mapped
to two regions, defining instead a so-called ‘multifunction’ or set-valued
map.
32This assumes that being located in spacetime provides a necessary condition for an
object to be a material object.
33Donnelly (2011) sees this as the major issue separating endurantists and perdurantists.
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Although some have considered the metaphysical possibility of multi-
ple location in space, it does not seem to be required by physics: the loca-
tion relations we have encountered thus far provide a notion of exact loca-
tion that defines a function between objects and spatial regions.34 When it
comes to considering endurance in spacetime, however, the idea of multi-
ple location seems to naturally arise. For example, the endurantist would
seem to want to say that the same point particle pi occupies different spatial
points fi(t) at distinct times. On the face of it, then, endurantism appears
to require multiple location: at distinct times, the same enduring object can
be located at distinct spatial regions.
This is the approach taken by Gilmore, who uses a location relation
of exact occupation to classify possible theories of persistence in locational
terms. Gilmore (2008) introduces this relation as follows:
Intuitively, a thing exactly occupies a region just in case the
thing has exactly the same shape and size as the region and
stands in all the same spatiotemporal relations to things as does
the region. Moreover, on the intended interpretation of the pred-
icate, there should be nothing contradictory or obviously false
about the claim that a single thing exactly occupies each of two
or more regions without exactly occupying their sum or any of
their proper subregions. (Gilmore 2008, 1228–9)
Thus Gilmore’s endurantist can maintain that an enduring object is located
at its path in virtue of exactly occupying each (time-indexed) region at
which it is exactly located while failing to exactly occupy their union, its
path.
We can use the (extension of the) relation of exact occupation to de-
fine a map between a domain of objects and a codomain of spatiotemporal
regions. Since the same enduring object exactly occupies distinct regions
at distinct times, the same enduring object O ∈ O is mapped to multiple
time-indexed spatial regions. In that case, the map defined by the exact
occupation relation isn’t a true function but is instead a set-valued map (or
‘multifunction’). A perduring object, on the other hand, can have tempo-
ral parts that each exactly occupy (at most) one spatial region—the spatial
region at which the object is exactly located at that time—, in which case
34To be fair, one could object that the avoidance of multiple location within quantum me-
chanics is essentially Pickwickian. That is, given the definition above it is perfectly possible
for a quantum system to be exactly located at a spatial region composed of two disjoint
regions. Nonetheless, by definition the system is not exactly located at either of the disjoint
regions separately; thus it is not multiply located.
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exact occupation defines a genuine (partial) function from objects to time-
indexed spatial regions.
This contrast is neat, and appears to do justice to Lewis’s claim that:
Perdurance corresponds to the way a road persists through space;
part of it is here and part of it is there, and no part of it is
wholly present at two different places. Endurance corresponds
to the way a universal, if there are such things, would be wholly
present wherever and whenever it is instantiated. (Lewis 1986,
202)
One would think that a universal can be multiply-located, if anything can.
And it seems like a reasonable interpretation of endurance to suggest that
exactly the same enduring thing exactly occupies distinct spatial regions at
different times. This seems to fit naturally with our usual way of talking
about things: ‘the tennis ball was on my side of the net and now it is on
yours,’ we might say, which seems to impute to the same object (the tennis
ball) two distinct locations.35
However, the idea that endurance involves (temporal) multiple location
has its detractors, most notably Parsons (2007, 2008). To define endurance,
Parsons (2007) makes use of the relation ‘wholly located’ instead. This rela-
tion mixes mereology and location: something is wholly located at a region
if none of its parts are missing from that region (ibid., 212). Thus enduran-
tism becomes the thesis that an object persists by having all of its parts
located at two disjoint times (ibid., 218). Parsons’ perdurantist asserts that
an object persists by having disjoint temporal parts (weakly) located at dis-
joint spatiotemporal regions.
I am not convinced that Parsons’ alternative definitions of endurance
and perdurance present any advantages. One of Parsons’ complaints about
Gilmore’s use of exact occupation is that:
Because Gilmore’s “exactly occupies” is not explained in terms
of location and mereology—and indeed cannot be—it would
make the question of “endurantism” vs “perdurantism” inde-
pendent of the question of whether objects are divisible into ar-
bitrary temporal parts. (Parsons 2007, 220)
But that is precisely the advantage of Gilmore’s approach: by cleanly sepa-
rating out the commitments of the perdurantist and endurantist into mere-
35Hirsch (2009) argues that the better fit of endurantism with our verbal habits counts in
its favor.
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ological and locational components he makes space for hybrid views of the
sort considered by Parsons (2000) himself.
In particular, Gilmore provides a classifying scheme for theories of per-
sistence in along two independent directions: mereological endurance/perdurance,
and locational endurance/perdurance. A mereological perdurantist (en-
durantist) believes that persisting objects have (no) temporal parts; a loca-
tional perdurantist (endurantist) believes that an object can exactly occupy
(more than) one spacetime region. Therefore, locational endurantism re-
quires multiple location. In ‘Must a Four-dimensionalist believe in Tem-
poral Parts?,’ Parsons (2000) explores the idea that an object could persist
by being temporal extended but without having distinct temporal parts
at distinct times. Expressed in terms of exact occupation, such a theory
is mereologically endurantist but locationally perdurantist (and thus four-
dimensionalist).
So let us embrace exact occupation, and with it Gilmore’s framework
for classifying and articulating different ways to persist. The question then
arises: how might we choose between them? At the root of the difficulties
in attempting to arbitrate between popular accounts of persistence is what
Gilmore (2006) calls the Location Question:
What is the general principle that determines, for any given ma-
terial object, which subregions of that object’s path are exactly occu-
pied by the object?
A correct answer to this question will tell us how to fill in the
following blank in such a way as to make the resulting principle
both true and informative:
For any material object O and spacetime region R, O exactly
occupies R if and only if [blank]. (Gilmore 2006, 208, original
emphasis)
Because theories of persistence such as endurance and perdurance ap-
pear to require incompatible answers to this last question, if we could fill
in the blank in an independent, non-question-begging manner we could
potentially find out whether material things endure, perdure, or neither.
In Section 1, I showed how both quantum and classical mechanics provide
satisfying answers to the question: how does a physical object occupy a
spatial region? The question now arises of whether the same location rela-
tions can brought to bear on the question of persistence.
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2.1 Continuum Mechanics and Persistence
Unfortunately, when it comes to arbitrating between endurantism and per-
durantism through an examination of physics, we face a problem of under-
determination. Whereas both classical and quantum mechanics seemed to
provide quite specific answers about how the physical objects of the theory
come to be located at spatial regions, they seem to be open to interpreta-
tion concerning their spatiotemporal locations. I will illustrate this first by
consideration of continuum mechanics.
In continuum mechanics, the successive spatial locations of an object are
given by the placement χ(·, t). At each time, this defines a function whose
domain is a set of parts (the ‘universe of bodies’) and whose codomain is a
set of regions (the ‘universe of shapes’). As we saw in Section 1.2, at each
time a continuum body has a well-defined location: its shape St, which is
the spatial region at which the body is exactly located at time t. Thus a
placement also defines a function of time, t 7→ St, whose domain is a set
of instants and whose codomain is a set of spatiotemporal regions exactly
occupied by the body.
But does the same object exactly occupy each of those regions? It is hard
to say: the function is silent about the existence of temporal parts since its
domain is not objects but times. Now, the endurantist may think that this
helps her case: if temporal parts are not given explicitly by physics then
perhaps they are not necessary for the purposes of physics. She may also
point to the fact that the placement only explicitly gives a coordination of
parts with spatial regions, which suggests an endurantist reading. Further-
more, she may take advice like the following to count in her favor:
The student must recall always that a body in assuming vari-
ous shapes never loses its identity and the properties assigned to it.
(Truesdell 1991, 87, original emphasis)
Nonetheless, the perdurantist may plausibly interpret the data in sym-
pathetic terms by taking the successive instantaneous shapes, St, of a body
O to be nothing but the locations of its instantaneous temporal parts. In par-
ticular, she may say that the placement, considered as a function of time,
does not map the same body to many instantaneous locations but rather
maps each distinct (instantaneous) temporal part of the body Ot  O to a
single spatial region, and the same for its parts. By maintaining that each
temporal part of the body Ot exactly occupies one spatial region, St, she
avoids multiple location.
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As we might expect, this perdurantist view is a close temporal ana-
log of pertension (considered in Section 1.1): since these temporal parts
are singly-located, this perdurantist takes the binary relation ‘exact occu-
pation’ to define a function from a domain of (temporal) parts of O ∈ O to
a codomain of subregions of its path, R ≤ P. If we want this perdurantist
location function to be surjective then we need only restrict the codomain
to the maximal spatial slices of P, which in this case are the shapes St. This
seems like a fair reading of what the perdurantist might want to say in this
case; indeed, these parts (if they exist) would precisely satisfy Sider’s (1997)
definition of an instantaneous temporal part.
However, it is notable that the only perdurantist to take seriously the
import of continuum mechanics for the metaphysics of persistence argued
against the existence of instantaneous temporal parts. Instead, Butterfield
(2006a,b,c) advocates an ‘anti-pointilliste’ perdurantism which maintains
that persisting objects have all and only temporally extended temporal
parts. His reasons for adopting this position are complex, but Butterfield
(2006c) recommends this version of perdurantism as a handy way of avoid-
ing the negative conclusion of the rotating disks argument.
There is, however, an additional reason to prefer this version of per-
durantism in the context of continuum mechanics: it respects a symmetry
between time and space (often taken to be a significant motivation for per-
durantism). In particular, a continuum body and its parts are only ever ex-
actly located at regions of nonzero spatial volume. In that case, Butterfield’s
anti-pointilliste perdurantist maintains that a continuum body occupies re-
gions of spacetime in the same way that an endurantist would maintain
that a continuum body pertends the region of space at which it is exactly
located.
In more detail, the definition of pertension satisfied by continuum me-
chanics involved an order-preserving surjection from a partially ordered
set of (spatial) parts to a partially ordered set of spatial regions. I will de-
fine Butterfield’s version of perdurance, which I call B-perdurance, sim-
ilarly but with a codomain of spatiotemporal regions. For this purpose,
consider the set of spatiotemporal regions ofM formed by taking only sets
of point-events e ∈ M of definite spatiotemporal volume, i.e., only sub-
sets Lebesgue measurable in R4. As in the case of quantum mechanics, we
will identify sets that differ only by a set of measure zero and use the set-
theoretic operations to define a Boolean algebra of spatiotemporal regions
U = 〈U,∨,∧,¬〉.36
36This algebra of regions is given uniquely ifM is Newtonian, otherwise it is to be given
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we find that P corresponds to some region R ∈ U with nonzero spatiotem-
poral volume. Temporally extended subregions of P (with maximal spatial





The set of all such subregions S(t1,t2) ≤ P corresponds to a partially ordered
subset of U (here, ordered by subset inclusion of the temporal intervals).
In our terms, Butterfield’s anti-pointilliste B-perdurantist maintains that
every subregion of P ∈ U with nonzero volume is exactly occupied by a
(temporal) part of O ∈ O. We can express this more precisely:
B-perdurance. An object O B-perdures if exact occupation defines a (parital)
function f : O → U from its temporal parts Ot  O to the temporally
extended maximal subregions S(t1,t2) ≤ P of its spatiotemporal path
P that is (i) surjective; (ii) order-preserving.
This is a precise analogue of the definition of pertension of Section 1.1 and,
again, it applies equally well to a collection of classical point particles.
Note, however, that for B-perdurance to hold in continuum mechanics
we must divorce exact occupation from the relation of exact location that
holds at an instant. That is, while the instantaneous location relation con-
sidered in Section 1.1 as exact location would suffice to define exact occupa-
tion for a pointilliste perdurantist (who believes in instantaneous temporal
parts) it cannot do so for the B-perdurantist (who does not). Instead, the
B-perdurantist maintains that temporal parts of a continuum body exactly
occupy only the temporally extended regions formed by taking the union of
spatial regions St at which the continuum body is exactly located (accord-
ing to its placement). Before continuing to address persistence in quantum
mechanics, which will pose some problems for this view, I first explore this
idea of temporal extension.
relative to an inertial frame. Note that a perdurantist who believes in instantaneous tempo-
ral parts would not want to identify measure zero regions in this way.
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2.2 Temporal Extension vs. Extent
Lewis’s (1986) definition of a persisting thing as something that is wholly
present at two distinct times suggests that an object can persist merely in
virtue of exactly occupying two spatial regions belonging to disjoint in-
stants of time. As I will put it, such an object exactly occupies a region
with mere temporal extent. According to classical mechanics, however, the
path of a persisting object is given by a continuous function of time whose
range is a temporally extended region of spacetime. Existing at two times is
necessary for something to persist, but is it sufficient?
To illustrate what is at stake here, it will be helpful to consider the anal-
ogy with spatial extension. Take the example of a system of eight classical
point particles, located at opposite vertices of a cube of volume l3. What
is the dimensionality of the spatial region in which the point particles are
located? There are two plausible answers: (a) they are located in a cubi-
cal three-dimensional region of volume l3, or (b) they are located at eight
spatial points, collectively having zero volume, i.e. a zero-dimensional re-
gion. The answer (a) corresponds the locations of the particles having
three-dimensional spatial extent, and (b) corresponds to the fact that the
region at which the particles are (exactly) located is not spatially extended.37
Here is a recent explication of ‘being spatiotemporally extended’ that
conflates these two quite distinct notions:
Say that an entity is extended just in case it is a spatiotemporal
entity and does not have the shape and size of a point. In this
sense of ‘extended’, a solid cube would count as extended, but
so would the mereological sum of two point-particles that are
one foot apart. Although such a sum would have zero length, it
would be a scattered object and so would not have the shape of
a point. (Gilmore 2013, §5, original emphasis)
I want to suggest that the two senses of extension mentioned here deserve
to be sharply differentiated. There is an important sense in which a solid
cube counts as spatially extended whereas a collection of point particles
has only spatial extent: the region at which a cube is (exactly) located has
nonzero volume, i.e., finite Lebesgue measure on R3, whereas any finite
collection of point particles is located at a region with zero volume, i.e.,
Lebesgue measure zero.
37Note that if those same eight particles were arranged in a plane the first answer would,
presumably, now be that they are located in a two-dimensional region. Thus the answer (a)
is contingent on the locations of the particles, whereas (b) is not.
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When it comes to temporal extension, we must restrict the spatiotempo-
ral path of an object to its temporal dimension alone. Let us say, then, that
the path of a persisting object is temporally extended iff its temporal exten-
sion is a set of instants with finite Lebesgue measure; and if its temporal
extension has Lebesgue measure zero then it has mere temporal extent.38
Thus the temporal extension of a finite collection of instantaneous tempo-
ral parts has measure zero (and so has mere temporal extent) whereas a
B-perdurantist’s temporal part S(t1,t2) has measure |t2 − t1|, and is, there-
fore, temporally extended.
It is standardly assumed that if something occupies a region of space
for a single instant then it does not persist. Yet Lewis would allow that an
object located at two instants persists in virtue of having mere temporal
extent. But can an object that flickers into existence at only two instants
in the history of the universe really be considered to be a persisting thing?
Although most of the metaphysics literature would seem to view having
mere temporal extent as sufficient to persist, I suspect that this is essentially
because the question has not been seriously considered by its authors.39
This question will become pressing in light of the result I present in the
next section, which implies that the path of a quantum mechanical system
has (at most) mere temporal extent.
3 Quantum Mechanics and Persistence
As with classical continuum mechanics, the formalism of quantum me-
chanics seems to provide no definitive answer as to whether objects are
multiply- or singly-located at their path. In that case, there would be little
evidence here to help us choose between Gilmore’s locational perduran-
tism/endurantism. However, I have already argued that there is a case
to be made against mereological perdurantism in quantum mechanics: on
one interpretation of what it would be for a quantum system to have tem-
poral parts, a result called Pauli’s Theorem rules them out (Pashby 2013).
This suggests that the perdurantist may want to pursue a mereologically
endurantist but locationally perdurantist theory of persistence instead, ac-
cording to which a quantum system persists by exactly occupying its spa-
38Considered with respect to Lebesgue measure on R, a set of instants has measure zero
iff it can be entirely covered by a countable set of open intervals (ci, di) ⊂ R of arbitrarily
small length, |di − ci| < ε for any ε > 0.
39Aside from Butterfield, however, we find Hudson (2001) arguing that a person cannot
be identified with an instantaneous object since a finite time span is required to secure their
identity through continuity of thought. For him, a person must be temporally extended.
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tiotemporal path. I have called this theory of persistence temporal holism
(Pashby 2013), and here I further note that this position can be motivated
by applying the perdurantist analogy between location in space and loca-
tion in time to quantum mechanics.
That is, in continuum mechanics, the spatial regions at which bodies
are located are not pointlike and so, reasoning by analogy, we found an
argument in favor of Butterfield’s ‘anti-pointilliste’ B-perdurantist, who re-
jects instantaneous temporal parts of perduring objects. If, however, we
run the same argument from analogy using the mode of spatial location of
quantum mechanics—spanning—the perdurantist should conclude that a
quantum object perdures without having temporal parts. That is, the ar-
gument from analogy with spatial location in quantum mechanics leads to
mereological endurantism.
However, this argument against mereological perdurantism in quan-
tum mechanics is not watertight since the perdurantist may choose to ig-
nore the argument from analogy and adopt a distinct definition of temporal
parts (that is not threatened by Pauli’s Theorem). In particular, one could
simply import the definition of temporal parts from continuum mechanics
by using (quantum) exact location to define the path of a quantum system
in the same way, namely by forming the union of its instantaneous spa-
tial locations. Then one simply posits the existence of an appropriate set
of temporal parts that are related to subregions of the path by a relation of
exact occupation. (I explain exactly how this works in the next subsection.)
Unfortunately for the B-perdurantist, however, the path of a quantum
system cannot be temporally extended, as I now argue. This implies that
this version of mereological perdurantism is ruled out by quantum me-
chanics. It also shows that the scope of both locational perdurantism/endurantism,
too, is limited to (what I will term) a discontinuous spatiotemporal path, so
presenting problems for locational persistence theories in general.
3.1 Quantum Location in SpaceTime
To define a quantum system’s spatiotemporal path, we need to consider
time development of the system. Given the Hamiltonian operator for the
system, Hˆ, the time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation determines how the
state of the quantum system changes with time. It is first-order in time, so
that if we know the state of a system at some instant of time we can apply
the Schro¨dinger equation to find the state at every instant of time. Thus for
a system in state ψ ∈ H at time t = 0 the Schro¨dinger equation returns a
family of states ψt ∈ H, one for every t ∈ R. To find out what is true of
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the system at time t, we apply the Born Rule to the state ψt. This way of
thinking about time evolution is known as the Schro¨dinger picture.40
This family of states ψt is related to the Hamiltonian through a corre-
sponding family of unitary operators41 parameterized by t ∈ R that is gen-
erated by Hˆ, Uˆt = e−iHˆt. This unitary family implements the group of time
shifts on H, which is to say that the operator Uˆt corresponds to a time shift
of t seconds from t = 0. So, if the state of a system at time t = 0 is ψ, then
the state at time t is obtained by shifting ψ forward by t seconds, that is
ψt = Uˆtψ.42
In this picture, the localization scheme is the same at each time, and
the condition we used to define (entire) location in space will suffice as a
definition of location in spacetime (at an instant). Applying the Born Rule
to Pˆ∆, the projection associated with region ∆, we obtain:
Pr(∆ at t) = 1 = 〈ψt|Pˆ∆ψt〉
=⇒ Pˆ∆ψt = ψt.
That is to say that a system is entirely located at ∆ at time t iff Pˆ∆ψt = ψt,
which is essentially just the definition from Section 1.3, and the definition
of exact location at a time follows in the same way by requiring that the
system is not entirely located at any subregion of ∆.
In analogy with continuum mechanics, when a quantum system is ex-
actly located at a (bounded) region ∆t at time t we will say it has the shape
∆t. As with continuum mechanics, we define the path of a quantum system





The crucial difference, however, is that a quantum system need not have
a shape at all at a given time. That is, although the normalization condi-
tion 〈ψt|ψt〉 = 1 ensures at every time the system is entirely located at the
universal region, there may be no bounded region at which it is entirely
located, in which case it is not exactly located anywhere.
40There is also the Heisenberg picture, in which the state is constant in time and the local-
ization scheme evolves with time. These two pictures of time development are distinct, but
they return the same probabilities for instantaneous measurements of an observable, such
as Pˆ∆. We will only use the Schro¨dinger picture.
41A unitary operator Uˆ leaves the inner product unchanged, i.e. 〈Uˆψ|Uˆφ〉 = 〈ψ|φ〉 for all
ψ, φ ∈ H, and has the property that Uˆ†Uˆ = UˆUˆ† = I.
42This statement is, in fact, completely equivalent to the Schro¨dinger equation
−ih¯(d/dt)ψt = Hˆψt, which is just the infinitesimal form of this relationship.
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The crucial distinction between locational endurantism/perdurantism
hinges on whether or every shape is exactly occupied by the same object,
or by a temporal part. This question cannot be decided by restricting the
path alone, which is merely the image of the (multi)function defined by
the relation of exact occupation. However, the allowed path of a quan-
tum mechanical system can constrain the viable options for the locational
persistence theorist. In particular, note that B-perdurance requires that the
range of the function defined by exact occupation includes at least one tem-
porally extended region (else it is empty). If the path of a quantum system
cannot include any such region then a quantum system cannot B-perdure. I
now argue that this is indeed the case: quantum mechanics places just such
a restriction on the path of any physically reasonable quantum system.
3.2 No Temporally Extended Paths
To say precisely what ‘physically reasonable’ means here, we need to in-
troduce the dual role of the Hamiltonian as energy observable. That is, ap-
plying the Hamiltonian operator Hˆ to the state of the system ψ returns the
expectation value of the energy 〈H〉 = 〈ψ|Hˆψ〉, which is (something like)
the most likely value found if Hˆ were to be measured. We can also think
of the allowed energies of the system as corresponding to projections, in
exactly the same way as the possible locations of the system correspond to
projections in a localization scheme.43 So, associated with the proposition
‘the energy of the system lies within range α = (e1, e2)’, there is a projection
Pˆα determined by Hˆ such that if Pˆαψ = ψ then the energy of a system in
state ψ lies within α. Similarly, if Pˆαψ = 0 then the value of the energy of
the system certainly does not lie within α.
In quantum theory, it has become standard to assume that any physi-
cally possible system will have a Hamiltonian with the characteristic that
there is a value of energy below which the energy of the system cannot
drop. This is known as the spectrum condition, which thus says that the
spectrum of the Hamiltonian of every physical system (which specifies the
possible values of energy of the system) is bounded from below.44 In terms
of the projections Pˆα, the spectrum condition says that there is some value
of energy e0 such that the projection corresponding to the energy interval
43This is through the unique association of a self-adjoint operator Hˆ and a so-called Pro-
jection Valued Measure mentioned in the Appendix.
44This condition lies at the root of related results of Halvorson and Clifton (2002) con-
cerning relativistic localization.
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(−∞, e0] is zero in every state, i.e. Pˆ(−∞,e0]ψ = 0 for all ψ ∈ H.45
Therefore, so long as the spectrum condition holds it is impossible for a
system to have energy less than this value e0 (where the particular value de-
pends on the form of the Hamiltonian). Note how strange a system would
be that didn’t meet this condition. Such a system would have no lower
bound on its energy. That means that one could extract today enough en-
ergy from the system to power the city of Pittsburgh for 24 hours, and then
tomorrow extract enough energy to power Pittsburgh for 24 hours, and so
on ad infinitum. We have certainly never come across such a system in na-
ture. It seems safe to assume that such systems are not physically possible.
Surprisingly, this rather mild restriction on the Hamiltonian operator
suffices to put a quite severe restriction on the way that a quantum sys-
tem can be located at a spatial region over time. This is captured by the
following proposition (see the Appendix for a proof).
Proposition 1. Let ψ ∈ H, a unit vector, be the state of a quantum system. Let
Pˆ∆ be the projection associated with a bounded spatial region ∆ by the localization
scheme. Let ψt = Uˆtψ, with Uˆt = e−iHˆt the unitary group of time translations
generated by Hˆ, a self-adjoint operator with spectrum bounded from below.
Then either
1. the system is always entirely located at ∆, that is, Pˆ∆ψt = ψt for all t ∈ R,
or
2. the set of times at which Pˆ∆ψt = ψt has Lebesgue measure zero, in which
case there is no time interval (t1, t2) ⊆ R such that the system is entirely
located at ∆ at every time t ∈ (t1, t2).
Furthermore, the Hamiltonian Hˆ includes an infinite potential on the boundary of
∆ if and only if every state entirely located at ∆ at a time is confined to ∆ for all t
by Uˆt, that is, when Pˆ∆UˆtPˆ∆ψ = UˆtPˆ∆ψ for all ψ ∈ H, for all t ∈ R.
This proposition says that, given a spatial region ∆ and a Schro¨dinger
picture family of states ψt whose evolution is determined by a semi-bounded
Hamiltonian Hˆ, there are two exclusive possibilities covered by Case 1 and
Case 2.46 It also says something about the conditions under which Case 1
might apply. In particular, if the region in question is surrounded by an
45This is to say that the range of the projection is empty. Since this is a spectral projection
of Hˆ, this condition is equivalent to the spectrum of Hˆ being bounded from below.
46This result is closely related to the phenomenon of ‘instantaneous wavepacket spread-
ing’ (Hegerfeldt 1998). See the Appendix for the key result of Hegerfeldt’s paper, from
which my proposition follows.
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infinite potential then a system entirely located in that region at any time is
entirely located there at every time (and thus Case 1 applies).
My interest here is in using these results to place restrictions on the al-
lowed spatiotemporal path of a quantum system. In particular, now argue
that we can rule out the idea that a quantum system persists by being lo-
cated at a temporally extended path. The argument proceeds by showing
that the only way a quantum system can have such a path is if it forcibly
confined to some particular region over all time (by an infinite potential).
Therefore, if the path of a quantum system is to be temporally extended
then some very special situation must obtain. The unsatisfiable nature of
this necessary condition demonstrates that no actual quantum system per-
sists by having a temporally extended path.
Above, the path of a quantum system was defined as the spatiotempo-
ral region that results from taking the union of all the instantaneous regions
∆t at which it is exactly located. At each time t at which the system has an
exact location, we can find a bounded spatial region Γ ∈ SQ that includes
∆t (considered as a spatial region). In particular, we will choose Γ so that at
any time that the system that has an exact location ∆t, the system is entirely
located at Γ. Thus whenever the system is entirely located at ∆t it is also
entirely located at Γ, i.e., ∆t ≤ Γ for all t.
If the path of the system is temporally extended then there exists a set
of times T with finite Lebesgue measure such that the system is entirely lo-
cated at Γ at each time t ∈ T. For a system in state ψ we apply Proposition
1 to Γ and conclude that the system is entirely located at Γ at every time t,
i.e., PˆΓψt = ψt for all t ∈ R. This demonstrates that if a quantum system
has a temporally extended path then there exists some bounded region of
space at which it is always entirely located. Furthermore, I claim that there
is some subregion Σ ≤ Γ at which the system is almost always exactly lo-
cated, where ‘almost always’ means for every t ∈ R \ {tk} with {tk} a set
of measure zero.
Confinement. If there is a bounded region ∆ ∈ SQ at which a quantum
system O is always entirely located (i.e., to which Case 2 applies) then,
for almost all t ∈ R, the system is exactly located at some particular
subregion Σ ≤ ∆.
Proof. Consider the set of times T at which the system is entirely located at
a proper subregion Σ < ∆. By Quantum Entire Location, for each τ ∈ T
there exists a region Στ < ∆ at which is the system is exactly located. If
T has measure zero then the system is almost always exactly located at ∆
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and we are done. Otherwise, apply Proposition 1 to each Στ: either the
system is entirely located at Στ for all t (Case 1) or the system is located at
Στ for a set of times T′ ⊆ T with measure zero (Case 2). If Case 2 applies
to all Στ then T has measure zero and we are done. Otherwise, there exists
some nonempty set of regions F = {Στ}τ∈T at which the system is always
entirely located. Assume for reductio that F has no minimal element when
ordered by Lebesgue measure. But then the system is never entirely located
anywhere, and so a minimal element of F, Σmin, must exist. Therefore, Case
2 of Proposition 1 applies to any Ω < Σmin and the system is almost always
exactly located at Σmin ≤ ∆.
Given these results, it is reasonable to assert that that a quantum system
will have a temporally extended path only if it is forcibly confined to some
particular region by an infinite potential.47 Although this situation makes
sense in terms of the theory, it is unphysical: we know of no infinite po-
tential wells in nature, and we do not know how to create one, since to do
so would apparently require a source of infinite energy. Clearly, no objects
around us are confined to their path by an infinite potential well. Therefore,
we should not suppose that any actual quantum system persists by having
a temporally extended path.
Given the purportedly fundamental status of quantum mechanics, this
result could be interpreted as saying that no physically possible objects
persist by being located at a temporally extended spatiotemporal path.48
Therefore, if one were also persuaded by the idea that having a tempo-
rally extended path is necessary to persist, then one would be forced to
conclude that nothing actually persists. I doubt that this a conclusion that
many would welcome. More positively, someone who accepts the signifi-
cance of this result but regards mere temporal extent as sufficient to persist
could see this as a demonstration that the spatiotemporal path of a persist-
ing thing has mere temporal extent and is thus necessarily discontinuous
(or discrete) in time.
47Note that I have not shown that a system confined to a region in state ψmust be confined
there by a infinite potential, since there could exist other states of the system where it is not
so confined. It seems likely that one could arrive at a result that excludes this possibility by
restricting the domain of the Hamiltonian to a set of ‘well-behaved’ states along the lines of
Berndl et al. (1995).
48Admittedly, quantum mechanics loses out to relativistic quantum field theory in the
fundamentality stakes. However, the locational persistence theorist will not have an easier
time finding a well-defined spatiotemporal path in that context due to the problem of rela-
tivistic localization (Butterfield and Fleming 1999; Debs and Redhead 2003; Halvorson and
Clifton 2002).
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Figure 1: Illustrating a discontinuous spatiotemporal path
4 Implications for Persistence
For those who believe quantum mechanics to be a fundamental theory of
matter, the results presented here apparently demonstrate that the path of
a persisting material thing cannot be temporally extended. This is surpris-
ing, since it is commonly presumed (implicitly if not explicitly) that per-
sisting things can, and do, follow continuous spatiotemporal trajectories.
Certainly, according to classical mechanics they do. But if the analysis of
persistence in quantum mechanics given here is correct, however, then they
do not. That is, while it appears at a macroscopic level that persisting ob-
jects such as bananas and chairs follow a continuous path through time,
at the microscopic level of their quantum constituents (electrons, protons,
etc.) the path is in fact discontinuous. (Illustrated in Figure 1.)
Note, then, that we have a conclusive result regarding Butterfield’s B-
perdurantist: a quantum system cannot B-perdure since its path includes
no temporally extended regions. For a perdurantist who allows instanta-
neous temporal parts, however, the situation is less dire. If this perdurantist
can accommodate herself to the idea that a perduring object occupies a spa-
tiotemporal path with mere temporal extent then there is nothing to stop
her asserting that quantum systems perdure by having a collection of in-
stantaneous temporal parts exactly located at a collection of spatial regions
∆t ≤ P.
This would be a significant departure from the idea that a perduring ob-
ject is a ‘space-time worm’ that occupies a worldtube of space-time,49 but
49A worldtube is (the image of) a continuous function of time and so the discontinuous
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perhaps we should not be surprised that proper consideration of quantum
mechanics requires a significant departure from the usual options consid-
ered by metaphysicians of persistence. Indeed, a necessarily discontinuous
spatiotemporal path also presents a problem for the endurantist.
4.1 Immanent Causation, Endurance and Location
Some endurantists have thought that the identity of the three-dimensional
thing located at different spatial regions at distinct times is grounded in a
relation of spatiotemporal continuity, which Proposition 1 says the path of a
persisting thing cannot have.50 The idea is that, rather than positing by fiat
the relation of identity which holds between successive three-dimensional
things, we should find an appropriate relation that holds between them
which suffices to ground these facts about identity through time. How-
ever, consideration of so-called immaculate replacement scenarios, according
to which, say, an enduring thing could be annihilated and replaced by an-
other qualitatively identical but distinct enduring thing created ex nihilo at
a successive moment of time, has led to something of a consensus that spa-
tiotemporal continuity is neither necessary nor sufficient for identity over
time.
Instead, it is often thought that what is required by the endurantist is a
relation of immanent causation between the successive states of an instanta-
neous thing. This seems to weaken the need for spatiotemporal continuity.
As Zimmerman (1997) puts it:
[S]patiotemporal continuity is, at best, an epiphenomenon of
persistence. What is absent in immaculate replacements is causal
dependence of the later stages upon the earlier stages; the later
stages are not the way they are because the earlier stages were
the way they were; the later stages do not “evolve out of” the
earlier stages, as they should in the case of a genuine persisting
thing. Once the importance of causal relations among stages
is recognized, the significance of spatiotemporal continuity be-
gins to fade. Stories involving objects that jump discontinu-
ously start to sound plausible, as long as the right kind of causal
connections are preserved among the stages of a given jumping
object. (435)
spatiotemporal paths under consideration here are not worldtubes.
50For example, (Zimmerman 1997, 434–435) reports that C. D. Broad thought that the
spatiotemporal continuity of qualitatively similar three-dimensional stages was sufficient
for a series of stages to constitute the same thing persisting through time.
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Thus it seems as though the endurantist could resist the problem posed by
a discontinuous spatiotemporal path by suggesting that temporally disjoint
locations of a quantum system could be related by immanent causation.
What is more, locational persistence theorist Gilmore (2006, 2008) con-
tends that a principle he calls MURIC (MUlti-location Requires Immanent
Causation) should be viewed as a necessary condition for a persisting ob-
ject to endure by being multiply located.51 Gilmore (2008) explains MURIC
as follows:
[I]n order for [the same] material object to exactly occupy dis-
tinct spacetime regions R and R∗, a causal relation of the appro-
priate sort (often called ‘immanent causation’) must hold be-
tween the contents of R and the contents of R∗. (1244)
Applied to the analysis of exact location in quantum mechanics of Sec-
tion 1.3, interpreted as exact occupation, MURIC appears to demand that
the state of the system at each three-dimensional spatiotemporal region at
which the system is exactly located be the cause of the state at subsequent
regions at which it is located. But since, by Proposition 1, the intervening
instants of time will (in general) be ones at which the system is not located
at any bounded spatial region, it seems hard to see what relation linking
these two regions could support a meaningful notion of immanent causa-
tion.
Plausibly, the relation that grounds the identity of a quantum system
over time is the lawlike relation that the family of states ψt bear to one
another in virtue of being related by unitary operators of the family Uˆt =
e−iHˆt, generated by the Hamiltonian Hˆ. But this is not a relation that the
states of the regions at which the system is exactly located satisfy, as I now
show. A relevant fact about the family of unitaries Uˆt is that its members
jointly determine a unique (self-adjoint) Hamiltonian operator Hˆ only if the
operator-valued function t 7→ Uˆt is continuous in time.52 But Proposition 1
says that this restricted family can’t possibly be continuous in time, and so
this set of states necessarily fails to determine a dynamical evolution of the
system.53
51See Balashov (2007) for a similar principle applied to stage theory, i.e., the diachronic
composition of the singly located instantaneous stages that constitute a persisting object on
that account.
52Stone’s Theorem says that every strongly continuous one-parameter family of unitary
operators uniquely determines a self-adjoint operator, and conversely. See (e.g.) (Pru-
govecˇki 1971, 331–338).
53Another way to put this is to say that a set of states {ψtk |ψ ∈ H, Pˆ∆Uˆtkψ = Uˆtkψ} cannot
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So, considered alone, the states at those regions are not related in a way
that can support the identity of the system through time. They are thus
poor candidates to ground the relation of immanent causation that MURIC
says must hold between them if the system is to endure. The alternative
is to let in every state in the evolution of the system, even those where
the system is not located at any bounded region. However, Proposition 1
says here that the vast majority of those states will be such that the system
cannot be said to be located at any bounded region since the set of times at
which it is so located has measure zero.54 This leaves the endurantist who
wishes to make use of immanent causation facing the following dilemma:
Either (almost) every region that lies outside the path of a persisting
object is related by immanent causation to the regions it is located at,55 or
if the states related by immanent causation are just those of the regions it
is located at then they don’t together compose a single object persisting
through time (according to the dynamical law of quantum mechanics).
Thus it seems that if immanent causation is required to knit the indi-
vidual three-dimensional stages into a single persisting thing then it must
hold between regions (almost) everywhere in spacetime, or it fails to do its
job of grounding the identity of the various three-dimensional things. In
this way, the discontinuous nature of the spatiotemporal path of a persist-
ing object implied by Proposition 1 proves problematic for the locational
endurantist, who claims a persisting thing is mutiply-located at its path, as
it also does for the B-perdurantist, who holds that persisting things exactly
occupy temporally extended spatiotemporal regions.
4.2 Objection: Quantum Mechanics is Open to Interpretation
Interpreting quantum theory is a tricky business. Of especial concern for
the project undertaken here—which involves taking results from a particu-
lar quantum formalism and interpreting them metaphysically—is the fact
that distinct interpretations of quantum mechanics represent divergent on-
tologies, and so implications that follow from one interpretation may be
strictly false according to another. For example, according to the so-called
be inter-related by a corresponding set of unitaries unless Pˆ∆ = I, since otherwise Uˆt′k Pˆ∆Uˆtk
is not a unitary operator.
54That is, by Proposition 1, regions I \ ∆t at which the system is definitively not located
must also be confined to a set of times of measure zero.
55The proviso ‘(almost) every region’ is meant in the usual sense that regions with mea-
sure zero (with respect to spacetime volume) are excluded. (It could be objected that the
relation of immanent causation is intended to be temporally asymmetric, in which case
modify this disjunct accordingly.)
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Bohmian interpretation,56 each particle of an n-particle (non-relativistic)
quantum system is located at a single point at every time, just as in clas-
sical mechanics. So, for the Bohmian, any uncertainty about the position of
a particle is a strictly epistemic affair, and she would have little reason to
care about my result.
However, the Hilbert space formalism I have made use of here has a
good claim to be regarded as the canonical form of quantum mechanics, in
the sense that it is generally the predictions of the Hilbert space formalism
that a viable interpretation is required to replicate, rather than vice versa.57
But even in interpreting the result of the previous section in terms of a
‘no-go’ result for a temporally extended spatiotemporal path and a ‘go’
result for a discontinuous spatiotemporal path, it may be objected that I
am assuming too much: what has been established is that a discontinuous
path is not ruled out; the existence of a discontinuous path is consistent with
these results but not implied by them.
Indeed, the import of such results is described by Wallace (2014) as fol-
lows:
Wave-packets with compact support cannot be created (they re-
quire infinite potential wells); if they were to be created, they
would spread out instantaneously. (1)
However, the idea that these instantaneously localized states require an in-
finite potential is itself interpretation dependent. For example, in the stan-
dard ‘Copenhagen’ interpretation, which endorses both directions of the
eigenstate-eigenvalue link, when we are in a position to infer that a system
has an eigenvalue for an observable we may infer that it is in the corre-
sponding eigenstate. In that case, when a position measurement at time t
reveals that the system is located in ∆ at time t (i.e., the projector Pˆ∆ has
eigenvalue 1) we infer that the system is in the corresponding eigenstate,
updating the state ψ by applying the projection Pˆ∆, i.e. ψt → Pˆ∆ψt. On
this interpretation, instantaneous localization requires no infinite potential
56Named after David Bohm, but with an important precedent in the work of Louis de
Broglie.
57In part, the reason for this is historical: Hilbert space was the mathematical arena in
which von Neumann was able to unify Schro¨dinger’s wave mechanics and Heisenberg’s
matrix mechanics, showing them to be different ways of representing the same theory. But
there is also a sense in which this formalism directly reflects essential posits of the theory,
such as Dirac’s Superposition Principle, and rests on deep mathematical results that knit
together (physically interpreted) symmetry groups and their representation by families of
unitary operators (such as Uˆt) on a Hilbert space Mackey (1963).
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well.58
Of course, such considerations merely establish the possibility that a
quantum system will have a series of exact locations and so possess a spa-
tiotemporal path (as defined above). What can we say if this is not the
case? First, if a system has no exact locations then it could persist by being
entirely located at all of space.59 In that case, one may regard it as having
spatial parts given by the localization scheme, and the perdurantist faces
my earlier argument by analogy against temporal parts (Pashby 2013).
However, one could also explore the use of different location relations.
For example, inspired by Albert and Loewer (1996), we could use e-location
rather than entire location, where a quantum system is e-located at a bounded
region ∆ just in case 〈ψ|Pˆ∆ψ〉 > 1− e, where 0.5 ≥ e > 0. This would lead
to a family of temporally extended ‘e-paths,’ nested according to the value
of e.60 This move could be motivated by reasons internal to quantum me-
chanics but would do violence to the metaphysics of location (based on the
relations of entire and exact location) that formed the foundation of this
paper.
5 Conclusion
This paper began with an attempt to bring into contact the metaphysics
of spatial location with the location relations enjoyed by physical systems,
as described by physics. I argued that both classical (namely, continuum)
mechanics and quantum mechanics provide explications of the relation of
‘exact location’ entertained by metaphysicians. Interestingly, it turned out
these two physical theories maintain that a physical object occupies a re-
gion of space in different ways: according to classical mechanics, a body
pertends the region at which it is exactly located; according to quantum
mechanics, a quantum system spans the region at which it is exactly lo-
cated.
Having extended this analysis to metaphysical theories of persistence
58Note that there are also interpretations of quantum mechanics that introduce a sponta-
neous localization of the wavefunction (Ghirardi et al. 1986).
59Recall that if ψt is normalized then 〈ψt|ψt〉 = 〈ψt|PˆSψt〉 = 1 for all t. If the system is
not located in any bounded spatial region at a time, then it is located at their union: all of
space.
60Although for an isolated quantum system the phenomenon of wavepacket spreading
would prove a problem for permanence (Blank et al. 2008, 236–238), consideration of de-
coherence effects should serve to secure permanence of macroscopic objects (Butterfield
2006c, §5) (albeit at the cost of their multiplicity).
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that make use of the relation of ‘exact occupation’, I presented a result
from quantum mechanics that implies that the spatiotemporal path of a
persisting quantum system must be discontinuous in time. This discon-
tinuity presents severe difficulties for Butterfield’s (2006a; 2006b; 2006c)
‘anti-pointilliste’ perdurantist, and for an endurantist who relies on imma-
nent causation to secure identity through time (Gilmore 2008; Zimmerman
1997). This suggests that such theories may not be well suited to describ-
ing the persistence of microscopic objects: if the ordinary objects of every-
day experience are considered fundamentally to be quantum systems, then
presumably these accounts of persistence fail there as well. More generally,
metaphysicians who use location in spacetime to express their theories of
persistence owe us an account of whether persisting objects are to be under-
stood at temporally extended objects, or objects with mere temporal extent.
This paper, then, has represented something of a negative contribution to
the persistence debate, corresponding to Gilmore’s fear that quantum theo-
ries “may show that the current range of options is incomplete or somehow
ill-formulated” (Gilmore 2008, 1247).
However, I would like to conclude by attempting to expand the set of
commonly considered metaphysical options for persistence by suggesting
a candidate that seems especially apt for describing the way that something
with a discontinuous path might persist. In particular, in the event-based
ontologies of Whitehead (1925) and Russell (1927) the persistence of ma-
terial bodies is given a distinctive interpretation in terms of recurring pat-
terns of discrete spatiotemporally located events.61 Moreover, these meta-
physicians were explicitly concerned with taking into account the morals
of modern physics: relativity and the burgeoning quantum theory.62 I will
save my attention for Whitehead. Although the process theory that White-
head was to develop would involve a richer ontology, discussing the per-
sistence of electrons in 1925 he proceeds as follows:
An electron for us is merely the pattern of its aspects in its en-
vironment [. . . ] I want to suggest that reiteration where it differs
from endurance is more nearly what the organic theory requires.
[. . . ] in the organic theory, a pattern need not endure in undif-
ferentiated sameness through time. The pattern may be essen-
61Since the events are intended to be ontologically prior to spatiotemporal points, which
are defined notions in this framework, this way of speaking is more than a little forced.
Nonetheless, it will suffice for present purposes.
62Russell (1927) acknowledges the assistance of Cantabrigian physicist R. H. Fowler, the
premier quantum theorist in Britain at that time (save for his brilliant protege P. A. M.
Dirac).
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tially one of aesthetic constants requiring a lapse of time for its
unfolding. A tune is an example of such a pattern. Thus the en-
durance of the pattern now means the reiteration of its succes-
sion of constants. (Whitehead 1925, 133–134, original emphasis)
I will not attempt an exegesis of Whitehead’s philosophy here, but this idea
that persistence through time can be more like a tune—a melody composed
of a series of discrete notes—seems especially apt for consideration in this
context. In particular, a melody sustains its identity through time even if
a note is not being played at all times. Indeed, typically there are gaps
(or rests) left between notes. And thinking of a tune may even impart
more qualitative difference to the ‘parts’ of a melody than strictly neces-
sary: think not of a melody but of a rhythm.63 A rhythm may be composed
of a series of qualitatively indistinguishable sounds (think here of a syn-
thesized drum hit) which nonetheless extends through time in virtue of the
distinctive, repeating pattern of time intervals left between sounds.64
While there may be no sound at a particular time, a rhythm persists
through time while it continues to be played. What constitutes the tem-
poral continuity here? Literally, the reiteration of the repeating pattern of
temporal intervals between events. In this way, the times that are not oc-
cupied are as vital to the persistence of the rhythm through time as the
times that are, but there are no ‘temporal parts’ of the rhythm at the times
where no sound is present. And neither is there a way in which the pre-
ceding sound ‘brings about’ the next in a causal sense. But note how the
persistence of the rhythm as a whole emerges at the level of an extended
temporal period, i.e., the rhythm requires “a lapse of time for its unfold-
ing.” Although this account of reiteration requires further elaboration, it
does suggest the possibility of persistence through means other than the
occupation of a spatiotemporally continuous path.
Appendix
The proof of the proposition makes use of the following lemma, due to
Hegerfeldt (1998).
Lemma 1. (Hegerfeldt) For any positive operator P, any vector ψ ∈ H, and
63This is, in fact, the terminology adopted by Russell (1927).
64For example, a simple clave rhythm in 4/4 time may be represented as X o o X o o X o
o o X o X o o o, where ‘X’ is a crotchet (quarter note), and ‘o’ a crotchet rest (during which
no sound is made).
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any unitary group Uˆt = e−iHˆt generated by a self-adjoint Hamiltonian Hˆ whose
spectrum is bounded from below either:
1. 〈ψ|Uˆ−tPUˆtψ〉 = 0 for all t, or
2. 〈ψ|Uˆ−tPUˆtψ〉 6= 0 for (almost) all t.
Restating the proposition here, we have:
Proposition 1. Let ψ ∈ H, a unit vector, be the state of a quantum system. Let
Pˆ∆ be the projection associated with a bounded spatial region ∆ by the localization
scheme. Let ψt = Uˆtψ, with Uˆt = e−iHˆt the unitary group of time translations
generated by Hˆ, a self-adjoint operator with spectrum bounded from below.
Then either
1. the system is always entirely located at ∆, that is, Pˆ∆ψt = ψt for all t ∈ R,
or
2. the set of times at which Pˆ∆ψt = ψt has Lebesgue measure zero, in which
case there is no time interval (t1, t2) ⊆ R such that the system is entirely
located at ∆ at every time t ∈ (t1, t2).
Furthermore, the Hamiltonian Hˆ includes an infinite potential on the boundary of
∆ if and only if every state entirely located at ∆ at a time is confined to ∆ for all t
by Uˆt, that is, when Pˆ∆UˆtPˆ∆ψ = UˆtPˆ∆ψ for all ψ ∈ H, for all t ∈ R.
Proof. Consider the projection corresponding to the spatial complement of
∆, Pˆ¬∆ = I − Pˆ∆. The premises of Hegerfeldt’s Lemma are satisfied by
ψ, Pˆ¬∆ and Uˆt. If Case 1 applies then 〈ψ|Uˆ−tPˆ¬∆Uˆtψ〉 = 0 for all t. Since we
have 〈ψ|Uˆ−tPˆ∆Uˆtψ〉 = 1− 〈ψ|Uˆ−tPˆ¬∆Uˆtψ〉 it follows that
〈ψ|Uˆ−tPˆ∆Uˆtψ〉 = 1 for all t ∈ R. (4)
We may ignore the possibility that Pˆ∆ = I since ∆ is by assumption a
bounded region. Thus ψt = Uˆtψ describes an evolution of the system such
that it is always entirely located at ∆, that is ψt = Pˆ∆ψt for all t ∈ R.
If Case 2 applies then for almost all t the system is not entirely located
at ∆. That is,
〈ψ|Uˆ−tPˆ∆Uˆtψ〉 = 1− 〈ψ|Uˆ−tPˆ¬∆Uˆtψ〉 6= 1,
except for a set of times of Lebesgue measure zero. Therefore, the set of
times at which Pˆ∆ψt = ψt has Lebesgue measure zero.
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If every state located at ∆ is confined to ∆ for all t then Pˆ∆UˆtPˆ∆ψ =
UˆtPˆ∆ψ for any ψ ∈ H, for any t ∈ R. It then follows from the spectral
calculus that Pˆ∆HˆPˆ∆ψ = HˆPˆ∆ψ, for all ψ ∈ H. Thus the restriction of the
domain of Hˆ to the subspace defined by Pˆ∆ forms a closed subdomain.
This shows that Hˆ can be written as a direct sum Hˆ = Hˆ∆ ⊕ Hˆ¬∆, where
Hˆ∆ψ = Pˆ∆HˆPˆ∆ψ for all ψ ∈ H. Blank et al. (2008, 14.6.1) demonstrate
that the existence of an infinite potential on the boundary of ∆ is sufficient
for such a decomposition to exist; it is necessary in the sense that a finite
potential will not have this result.
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